Spanish savings banks are financial institutions with a wide mission that comprises stakeholders' different goals. Thus, profit maximization is only one of the several goals to be achieved, and the widespread use of cost or profit efficiency as the unique comparative measure among banks may prove to be insufficient in this context. To overcome this problem, we build an overall performance measure for organizations that maximize a wide mission with multiple goals. We distinguish two types of savings banks: those controlled by Public Administrations and savings banks controlled by insiders. Each group implies a different arrangement of goals and differences across their performance indexes. Once we control for technology differences, our results show that insider-controlled savings banks favor those goals related to economic efficiency and universal access; furthermore, they perform better. On the other hand, regional development becomes the most favored goal when Public Administrations enjoy the control.
Introduction
The evaluation of efficiency has received preferential attention in the works concerning the banking sector, as can be seen in Berger and Humphrey (1997) , Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger et al. (1999) . A prominent line of investigation analyzes the existing link between organizational forms and efficiency of financial institutions : Aly et al. (1990) , Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992) , Cebenoyan et al. (1993) , Grabowski et al. (1993) , Mester (1993 Mester ( , 1996 , Pi and Timme (1993) , Lang and Welzel (1996) , Mahajan et al. (1996) and Altunbas et al. (2001) . These papers analyze the concern for agency conflict, wondering about which organizational structure works better to reduce costs or to increase profits, although they do not obtain very conclusive evidence in this respect.
Parallel to this, and from a corporate governance perspective, Prowse (1997) indicates that the financial sector is subject to an extensive regulation that reduces the ability of the corporate control market to discipline the managers. The solution to the agency problem comes, thus, from a competitive functioning of financial product markets, but also from the capacity of the different internal control mechanisms, such as ownership structure or the board of directors. Pi and Timme (1993) and Altunbas et al. (2001) investigate the effect that the differences in ownership structure exert on efficiency and, judging by the results, the efficiency of banks is positively related to private ownership of banks (Altunbas et al., 2001) and negatively related to the coincidence, in one person, of the functions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors. Besides, the concentration of ownership, the presence of institutional investors or the proportion of insiders in the board are not significant (Pi and Timme, 1993) .
Regarding the role that financial product markets play in the resolution of the agency conflict, the study of the link between regulation of the above mentioned markets and efficiency of the financial institutions has deserved special attention in the literature; e.g., Kumbhakar et al. (2001) . Thus, some investigations evaluate whether deregulation of credit markets (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997) or deposit markets (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995) has had a positive influence on efficiency. In all these works there underlies the need to eliminate obstacles for free competition in the banking sector, as it supposes an increase in competition in the product-market segments that, in the end, favors a better use of the productive resources on the part of the bank managers.
In the Spanish Banking Sector, we observe also an increasing deregulation, which has affected more prominently the savings banks, historically subject to major restrictions than commercial banking (Kumbhakar et al., 2001) . Nowadays, the activity of savings banks has been equalized to that of banks and savings banks have achieved remarkable increases in productivity (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1997) . When the operating system of both types of banks becomes similar, public authorities have centered their efforts to improve the efficiency of savings banks through the reform of the composition and functioning of their government bodies (Law 44/2002 , of November 22, 2002 .
Nevertheless, in order to evaluate the effect of this and other laws on savings banks management, it is not sufficient to evaluate efficiency in profits or in costs. The legislator has assigned to savings banks an important set of goals -some of them in contradiction with the maximization of value-at the same time that it has allocated the ownership of savings banks to several groups of stakeholders.
Considering what has previously been stated, the present article aims at fulfilling a double objective. First, we consider the elaboration of an aggregate index of performance to evaluate the management of organizations with a multiple-goal mission.
This index would become a way to calibrate the consequences of the possible conflict between agent and principals. Secondly, we present an application of the methodological proposal to the Spanish savings banks sector, characterized by the presence of several stakeholders and a multiplicity of goals, on the one hand, but also by the presence of a legislator, who establishes his preferences, thus influencing on the composition of the entities' government bodies.
The elaboration of an aggregate index of performance raises remarkable technical and empirical difficulties. First, in order to carry out an aggregation of goals it is necessary to know the weights attached to each goal, and this calculation is far from being trivial. Secondly, the production function of the above-mentioned goals is not known. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technology arose precisely to give response to some of these difficulties, as described in Lovell et al. (1995) . The identification of good practices in the management of multiple-goal organizations has already been treated in the literature on efficient frontiers. Thus, Bendheim et al. (1998) use DEA methodology to construct an indicator of corporate social responsibility towards the principal stakeholders, Piesse and Townsend (1995) evaluate the efficiency of building societies in the United Kingdom and Mester (1993) applies it to the Savings and Loans in the United States. This empirical approach is also usual in other contexts, as in the case of Lovell (1995) and Lovell et al. (1995) , who elaborate an aggregate index of macroeconomic performance for countries from individual indicators such as price stability, growth, level of employment and commercial scale.
Following this line of research, our work approaches the evaluation of the efficiency of Spanish savings banks from an alternative perspective. A common feature in most of the works that evaluate savings banks management is the use of the same indicators as for the case of private banking. That is, by means of productivity (Pastor, 1995, and Grifell-Tatjé and , costs (Maudos, 1996 , Lozano-Vivas, 1998 and Tortosa-Ausina, 2003 ), or profits (Lozano-Vivas, 1997 . Furthermore, these works compare the results obtained in terms of the above-mentioned indicators, wonderingimplicitly or explicitly-if the differences of ownership and government structure between banks and savings banks may cause different levels of efficiency. Nevertheless, the legislation has assigned a wider mission to savings banks since it has conformed a set of goals for these financial institutions, at the same time that it has assigned their ownership to several groups of stakeholders. According to this perspective, the managers of savings banks should replace the goal of value maximization with that of the maximization of the aggregation of goals included in the mission. Our work incorporates this multiplicity of goals and, in addition, it includes an analysis of the preferences of the legislator, proposing a methodology that allows us to evaluate the effects of changes in the configuration of the government bodies on the management and efficiency of savings banks.
In order to reach this aim, we first describe the frame in which the agency problem between the savings bank agent and the legislator takes place, based on in force legislation. Secondly, we identify differences in ownership structure and, therefore, in the mission of savings banks, thus making it necessary to control these differences in productive technology. Thirdly, we evaluate managers according to their ability to satisfy the above-mentioned goals; for this purpose we propose a first index of performance.
Fourthly, we contribute to define the structure of the mission by identifying the weights associated to each of the savings banks' goals. Finally, we incorporate the legislator's preferences, identified by the existing legislation on the government bodies, and we elaborate a second index of performance. Thus, it is possible to evaluate managers in the frame of a new contract that regulates the agency problem and that now turns out to be more complete (in the sense of more restricted). In this context, the efficiency of a savings bank will depend on the decisions made by the agent (as it happened in the first index), but also on the agent's ability to correctly understand the legislator's preferences.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review briefly the history of savings banks in order to define their mission and to identify stakeholders. The relationship between the methodology used and the underlying economic problem is presented in Section 3. The data and variables used in the empirical application are described in Section 4; while the results of this application appear in Section 5. The paper ends with a section of conclusions.
Spanish Savings Banks: Mission, Stakeholders and Ownership Structures
The interest arisen by Spanish savings banks is justified by the presence of peculiarities in their juridical form and governance structure, along with remarkable economic results. This combination has meant important and sustained earnings in their market share in the last decades in front of their rivals, the private banks, with no differences as for regulation or as for the products or services that both entities can offer that may justify these profits. Institutionally, savings banks are private foundations (or foundation-company), and as such their social function is to destine a part of their profits to the development of activities that reverberate in the well-being of the region where they are present, keeping the rest as reserves for the entity. Besides, they lack formal owners; the ownership of savings banks corresponds by law to each of the groups represented in their General Assembly, but without a purchase act as in the case of commercial banking. Regarding the nature of the firm, savings banks compete among themselves and with other financial intermediaries, thus being submitted to the discipline of the loans and deposits markets, specially since their financial activity has been equalized to that of commercial banks, which demands from them similar levels of efficiency to those of their competitors, as stated in Kumbhakar et al. (2001) . Even more interesting for our purpose is the fact that the regulation of savings banks activity entrusts them with multiple goals, which are explicit in their mission and which we now proceed to analyze.
Mission and stakeholders
The phenomenon of savings banks (henceforth, SB) arises in Europe at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century as an instrument that helps to encourage saving among the popular classes and to relieve the dependence on charity, in a context of industrialization, with appearance of wage earners and the growth of cities. The initial success of this experience in several European countries encouraged intellectuals and philanthropists to constitute SB also in Spain. Nevertheless, unlike what happened in other countries, the population's lack of confidence in the existing financial institutions and in the state's financial capacity made the implication of another institution necessary: the Pawnshops, which were public welfare entities, some of them already created at the beginning of the 18th century. Thus, when the Royal Decree of April 3, 1835, approaches the creation of SB it explicitly recognizes the lack of State credit and it expressly assigns the SB the mission to encourage saving among the middle and low classes of the society, to mobilize saving in safe and profitable conditions, to avoid social exclusion or marginalization regarding financial services and to fight against usury.
Originally, the Spanish law specified the use that SB could make of their surpluses, the enjoyment of which was restricted to contributors and users of the entity. In this first stage, therefore, SB had the characteristics of a foundation, because of the participation of Pawnshops, and the application of their results had a mutualist nature. Nevertheless, and after several vicissitudes, in 1933 it is established that SB will be considered as charitable-social institutions, and as such, they will help the State through their social, charitable and cultural programs, complementary to their fundamental activity, which is still the financial intermediation, as García-Cestona and Salas (2002) Table 1 .
[Table 1]
The result of the particular evolution of SB places them as entities whose juridical nature compares to that of private foundations of public interest (Hansmann, 1996) .
Their foundational characteristic, and therefore their non-profit nature, is gathered in the application of profits, destined to social programs. On the other hand, public interest is confirmed in the non-mutualist application of social program. Finally, their private nature guarantees that SB will carry out activities that are characteristic of financial institutions, looking for the maximum economic efficiency and the maximization of profits. The ideas exposed above allow us to assign multiple goals to SB; that is to say, a wide mission that is expressed in the presence of several groups of stakeholders represented in the government bodies and that allows to compare the consequences concerning the relation between performance and the use of the government mechanisms used by banks and savings banks (see Crespí et al., 2004) . Other groups, though not represented directly in the above-mentioned government bodies, also have their aims sustained in the in force legislation. Table 2 synthesizes the goals included in the mission of SB. This wide mission, or social mission, has been therefore the result of a long process of changes, modifications and insertions in the juridical nature of savings banks all through their existence, in which different groups, as their predecessors, have played a decisive role. This is the reason why these groups become also the main stakeholders in the savings bank attending to the goal or goals that they have promoted (see Table 2 ). As a summary of what has been previously stated, we might define the mission of SB in the following terms: "to contribute to making financial services a universal service rendered in conditions of economic efficiency and without abuse of market power, at the same time that it contributes to a better allotment of the created wealth and to the sustained development of the regions in which these entities are present".
[Table 2]

Ownership Structures and revealed preferences on the goals of the mission
We have divided Spanish savings banks into two groups, as shown in Table 3 . In the first one we include savings banks controlled by public administrations (PA); that is to say, those savings banks in which the PA group concentrates more than 50 per cent of the votes (considering together the local, provincial and autonomic PA's, and the founders of a public nature). The second group is formed by savings banks that are controlled by the insiders; savings banks where the group formed by personnel, contributors and private founders accumulate 50 per cent or more of the votes in the general assembly of the savings bank. This characterization also responds to the concern of the European authorities about the presence of public banks and competence, as we will finally mention.
[Table 3]
Voting distribution among the mentioned groups not only implies differences in ownership structure, but it can also reveal the preferences of the autonomic administration, which -by virtue of the LORCA-has competence upon the composition of the government bodies, about the goals to be reached by the savings bank. In this respect, some works show how major assignment of control rights to PA's has an impact on asset and liability policies of savings banks, which eventually results in less economic efficiency (Melle and Maroto, 1999) . From this perspective, the legislator's preferences on the goals to be reached by SB are implicitly expressed by means of voting distribution among stakeholders in the General Assembly. In PA-controlled savings banks, when the legislator expressly assigns more than 50 per cent of the votes of the General Assembly to this group, we consider that a major preference for the goals associated with this group is revealed, which, as shown in Table 2 , are the aims of universality, promotion of the competition and regional development, in front of the goals of economic efficiency and contribution to wealth distribution.
Nevertheless, when the legislator assigns the control of savings banks to insiders, the question of which interests he shows a priority over arises. The capacity of contributors to influence the functioning of savings banks is very limited, even if they could have a significant percentage of votes. On the one hand, this group's goals are protected by means of a debt contract, a deposit insurance and the possibility of exercising an exit option without excessive costs. On the other hand, the system used to elect their representatives (determined by lot and for an established period of time) and the limited power that they concentrate (one delegate, one vote) make it enormously difficult for this group to act in a coordinated way, thus allowing the executives to exercise a remarkable influence on this group. This situation of the contributors contrasts with that of the personnel, who have much capacity to influence on management, in spite of lacking high participation in the distribution of decision rights. The group of workers keeps a stable and lasting relation with the entity, and has quite homogeneous preferences. Therefore, employees have some decision power in connivance with the executives, as both groups show a clear preference for the entity's growth; this goal is linked to universality in service rendering. This growth supposes a major reputation and influence power for executives, probably with wage improvements and the possibility of increasing their independence in decision-making. Whereas for employees, growth means more options of internal promotion and wage rises. At the same time, both groups assume as their own the goal of economic efficiency, which is necessary to preserve their working positions and to justify increases in their salaries.
Finally, the non-society nature of savings banks makes them into entities that are more dependent on their ability to generate internal resources that can revert to financing their growth. For all this, and in spite of the fact that the interests of personnel and executives are not explicitly represented in the SB mission, we have interpreted that the majority assignment of control to insiders is the legislator's preference, given the growth and economic efficiency of the entity.
Multiplicity of goals and Data Envelopment Analysis
The economic problem
The central point of this work is the study of agency relationship between principals -the above-mentioned stakeholders-and the agent -the savings bank ( which is always subject to the transformation possibilities that technology allows, the production possibilities set (PPS). The mission of the organization is, therefore, an aggregation of the existing goals or, if we use the characterization of the firm as a subeconomy (Holmström, 1999 , Tirole, 2001 , we might say that the SB welfare function is an aggregation of the preferences on the outputs. If the above-mentioned aggregation had an additive form, welfare might be expressed as a weighted sum, Within the agency framework, any combination of goals that places SB on the production possibilities frontier (PPF) would indicate that its agent is taking the maximum benefit of the transformation possibilities of technology. If, besides, the PPS is convex, any point of the frontier can be optimal, since there will always exist some set of weights ( )
,..., i i µ µ for which the welfare function is tangent to the PPF. The choice of a specific combination of goals (that is to say, a point on the frontier) will depend not only on the conflict between agent and principal, but also on the result of the negotiation among stakeholders, as Tirole (2001) frontier. In such a situation, SB efficiency will be determined by the relation among the consumption of inputs used to obtain the outputs that have been given priority after the private negotiation process among the implied groups.
Besides, quite frequently governmental intervention restricts the set of contracts that can be signed between stakeholders. In this context, the "social planner", by means of procedure and laws, defines his preferences on the outputs, so that welfare weights are no longer the result of private negotiation among stakeholders, but are externally imposed. As is has already been pointed out in Section 2, the regulation on the composition of the SB government bodies might be revealing the legislator's preferences on the goals included in these entities' mission. In this new context, the evaluation of SB managers must be done from the perspective of a more restrictive agency contract: the agent assumes the task of transforming inputs into the five goals that stakeholders are interested in, but keeping the preference relation among goals defined ex-ante by the legislator.
The elaboration of an aggregate index of performance to evaluate the executives' skill to provide outputs to the stakeholders raises, however, remarkable empirical difficulties when there is a lack of information about technology, preferences and weights. This is why, in the following section, we present a methodological proposal to solve these problems.
Evaluation of agency conflict with DEA
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques offer answers to the abovementioned difficulties, as indicated by Lovell et al. (1995) . DEA turns out to be, in our opinion, particularly relevant in this case, since it does not try to estimate the form of the production function, but it uses the existing observations for the elaboration of an nonparametric empirical frontier where it is not necessary to know the exact form of the function that relates inputs to outputs. Applying DEA, we obtain an aggregate index of performance for each observation (in our case, for each savings bank), in comparison to the rest of observations, which measures the distance that separates a specific observation from the frontier.
No specific transformation function relating inputs and outputs is imposed; neither does it require knowing the weights associated to the above-mentioned variables.
Precisely, and by means of a dual transformation of the maximization programs that contain these techniques, it becomes possible to assign a set of weights to each of the mentioned goals. The only assumption that concerns DEA is that each observation should be placed on the extreme frontier or below it and that the set of obtained weights , : , , 1, 0, 1,...,
which is the smallest set that satisfies the conditions of free input and output disposability and includes all observations. This set satisfies conditions of convexity and monotonicity (Banker and Thrall, 1992) . Once the set of production possibilities T is defined, we formulate the problem of measuring SB mission attainment from the following linear program, which is solved I times, one for each SB (Banker et al., 1984) : can also be interpreted as the proportional increase all outputs needed to move the evaluated savings bank to the frontier, for some given inputs. Consequently, the aggregate index of performance that we had previously defined has the same value,
The weights that solve program [4] represent a relative evaluation of goals on the part of the evaluated firm, and there is no other weight combination that, given the possibilities of transformation of this technology, allows the evaluated SB to obtain a higher index of performance (Allen et al., 1997) . Therefore, we will interpret weights as a measurement of the relative importance that each savings bank assigns to its mission goals, and which appear as the result of the private negotiation among stakeholders.
Next, we propose a modification of program [4] so that we may incorporate the revealed preferences of the autonomic legislator. We thus construct a second index of performance that evaluates management of the SB, and by means of the comparison between both indexes, we will be able to identify and calibrate the allocative inefficiency of savings banks. That is to say, we will measure that part of inefficiency that is explained by the fact that, when managing multiple goals, executives do not interpret adequately the legislator's preferences.
Incorporation of the legislator's preferences
As it has already been pointed out, the incorporation of the legislator's (Thomson et al., 1990) or by means of an ordinal relation among weights (Golany, 1988) :
where ( ) , , r s t denote outputs. An interesting advantage of these restrictions is that they only need the arrangement of weights according to the relative importance that the legislator assigns to each goal, with no need to establish low and top limits. This characteristic is particularly relevant in our investigation, because the information about the composition of the savings banks General Assembly only allows us to arrange the goals.
According to what we exposed in Section 2, when the legislator assigns control to the group of public administrations he is showing a preference to the goals of universality ( 1 y ), encouragement of competition ( 3 y ) and regional development ( 5 y ).
Without additional information that allows us to arrange prioritized (and not prioritized) goals, we can now represent this preference relation from six relations among weights;
Similarly, the legislator's preference for the goals associated to insiders, the universality in service rendering ( 1 y ) and economic efficiency ( 2 y ) can now be expressed in terms of an arrangement of weights through six more restrictions: On the other hand, the distance that separates current decisions of the organization from those decisions that would place it on the frontier of good practice defined by the legislator can be quantified by the expression ( )
Obviously, the effect of incorporating the above-mentioned restrictions affects a decrease in the index of performance, unless the decisions of the SB manager respect the priority structure among goals defined by the legislator. Therefore,
o must be fulfilled. Besides, by comparing the previous indexes, we can identify a third index of performance, the allocative efficiency (AE):
This AE index allows us to evaluate if the manager has internalized, when taking decisions, the directives provided by the principal. If SB managers respect the priority order among goals defined by the legislator, the index of performance previous ( )
and subsequent to the introduction of restrictions on weights ( )
which implies that no allocative inefficiency exists (i.e., 1 AE = ). Given the construction of AE, we can decompose the index of performance that incorporates the legislator's preferences into the index of initial performance and allocative efficiency;
From the described methodology, in the following sections we propose an application to Spanish savings banks.
Definition of data and specification of variables
The information used in this study has been extracted, principally, from the The information used in this study consists of 135 observations (savings bankyear) and three entities have been excluded due to lack of information 2 . Besides, as a previous step to the estimation of the indexes of performance, the presence of outliers has been analyzed. As it is well known, the analysis of efficiency with deterministic DEA models is very sensitive to the presence of outliers in the sample. This is due to the fact that the frontier can be determined by observations that are extreme points, and this may affect the evaluation of efficiency of the rest of entities. In order to overcome the problems derived from extreme observations, we have used the methodology proposed by Wilson (1995) . The result of this analysis has allowed us to identify two SB with an efficiency level over average, Municipal SB of Vigo and Municipal SB of Burgos, both referring only to the year 2000.
The choice of variables is determined by the availability of public information and by the lack of precedents in the literature on economy that, orienting towards stakeholders, studies the governance of savings banks. The choice of inputs has not been really a problem, because in the literature on efficiency in the banking sector there exists enough unanimity regarding the use of accounting variables; see Favero and Papi (1995) or, for the Spanish banking sector, Pastor (1995) . Thus, we have selected three inputs that refer to human, physical and material resources: personnel expenses, a cost of capital defined by means of amortizations and operating expenses. On the other hand, given the available public information, we have selected five outputs that represent each of the goals included in the mission of savings banks.
The first goal consists in the universalization of financial services, that is to say, the promotion of saving among the popular classes, avoiding their exclusion of the financial system and trying to take the services to all citizens and places of the country.
The contribution of a financial institution to the reduction of marginality (or lack of banking activity) can be evaluated from the territorial dimension, locating their offices in small populations, and from the rendering of financial services to clients of low revenues (i.e. supporting clients with small balances). Unfortunately, neither the Statistical Yearbook of the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (SCSB) nor the annual reports of the savings banks present information about the number of branches in small populations, and neither do they contribute information about the number of accounts per volume of balances. As a first approach to the idea of marginality, we propose the construction of an indicator from two variables. The first one is the proportion of branches outside the capital of province over the total amount of branches of an entity, calculated as a Herfindahl index 3 . The second one is the inverse of the average balance of deposits, calculated as the relationship between the total number of deposits and the number of current accounts, saving accounts and deposit accounts.
The second goal is economic efficiency, that is to say, the mobilization of saving in safety conditions (to prevent bankruptcies and insolvency) and profitability (high levels of profits). Safety will improve when reserves, which are an increasing function of the final profits of the savings bank, are more abundant. Therefore, this second goal will be approached upon the profits after taxes.
To encourage competition and to avoid the abuse of monopoly is the third goal of the mission of savings banks. To obtain better conditions and lower prices would be the updated version of the traditional goal of the struggle against usury. The contribution of savings banks to competition in the Spanish banking sector can be seen in two ways:
first, the presence of savings banks increases the number of competitors in every market segment, which makes the market become more competitive; and secondly, savings banks follow a competitive behavior that favors the implantation of competitive prices.
The lack of data about the first way forces us to approach the contribution of savings banks to competition by means of prices for the rendered services, although in this case the availability of information is also limited. Thus, we have not considered the possibility of approaching prices from a calculation of the average interest rate with the Assets and Liabilities data, because public accounts of savings banks are not sufficiently detailed.
Nevertheless, the Economic Bulletin of the Bank of Spain publishes the free interest rates applied by financial institutions to their clients: prime rates, rates of interest for overdrafts in current account and rates of interest for exceeding. In our case, we have used the rate of interest for overdraft as an indicator of the contribution to the encouragement of competition, as we understand that the segment of population who pays this price is the one with less negotiation power (as opposed to prime rate of interest). As an approach to the difference between price and marginal cost, we have deduced, from the rate for overdraft, the SCSB reference rate of interest of assets on December 31 of each year. Since this difference is a measure of market power, in the empirical application we use the inverse of the above-mentioned difference.
The fourth goal is the contribution to the wealth distribution and welfare, which is measured by means of the amount of resources that savings banks destine to the rendering of services of a benefic-social nature. This indicator has some limitations, since, in the first place, savings banks carry out this kind of activity for legal imperative (although the percentage of profits destined to it is fixed, the entities choose their degree of implication) and, secondly, social program is an indicator of contribution to welfare distribution that may have no relation whatsoever with the equity in wealth distribution (the contribution of savings banks to welfare redistribution will largely depend on the fact that benefic-social programs affect especially the least favored segments of population).
Nevertheless, our information does not allow us to progress in these directions.
The last goal is the contribution to regional development: to attend to the genuine interests of the territory with projects that generate social externalities that the private sector is not in conditions to evaluate. The lack of interest on the part of the private sector will have to be compensated by the local PA. Therefore, the savings banks contribution to regional development can be approached from the proportion of credits granted to the AP over the total number of credits (Melle and Maroto, 1999) .
Unfortunately, we lack data about the role that savings banks play as a bank "close" to small and medium size businesses of a territory, which would be a possible way to approach the real contribution of savings banks to regional development.
[ Table 4 ] 
Empirical results
The first question analyzed in this work is to verify if the SB controlled by insiders and SB controlled by Public Administrations (PA) show similarities in the process of transformation of input into output. Using again the parallelism with DEA literature, we are wondering whether both groups share the same technology, because otherwise it would not make any sense to evaluate together the efficiency of both types of entity with a common frontier. To answer this question, we propose a two-stage test that has already been used in DEA literature; Elyasiani and Mehdian (1992) . In the first stage, the indexes of performance of the joint sample of entities evaluated, assuming, therefore, that technology is common. In the second one, these indexes are calculated for each subsample of savings banks (insiders and PA), thus assuming separate technologies.
Under null hypothesis, the arrangement of savings banks according to the indexes of performance for the joint sample turns out to be the same as the one that results from arranging all savings banks according to the indexes of performance obtained separately in both subsamples. Table 5 shows the results of this contrast and suggests that the population average (ANOVA), the functions of distribution (Kruskal-Wallis) and the median (Wilcoxon) of the indexes of performance of the combined sample are different, for a significance level of 5 per cent, from the corresponding indexes of the separate samples. Therefore, we can assume different technologies for both types of savings banks; a result that, moreover, is independent from the index of performance chosen for the contrast. In the same line, and following the reasoning presented in Elyasiani and
Mehdian (1992), we can justify technological disparity in the context of saving banks upon idiosyncratic characteristics of each model of organization, either in terms of its productive specialization or its organizational characteristics; we leaving for a future work the detailed exploration of these factors.
[ Table 5 ]
Nevertheless, we can offer a first explanation of the technological differences.
Regarding productive specialization, the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4 indicate that savings banks controlled by PA are of a smaller size. Probably, this is the reason why these entities direct their business towards less competitive regional markets (where they can offer services at higher rates of interest). The size of savings banks controlled by insiders is much larger and, predictably, they take part on more competitive markets in which, clearly, they have as opponents commercial banking representatives.
Entities of such relevancy as "La Caixa" or Caja Madrid belong to this second group.
Their size and the intensity of competition on the markets in which they take part certainly demand a more sophisticated management and, consequently, more qualified executives. This, in its turn, qualifies these entities to obtain higher levels of efficiency.
Regarding organizational characteristics, we can also state that ownership structure has an effect on the savings bank efficiency. More specifically, savings banks with an ownership structure that assigns the majority of control rights to PA have a lower index of performance, which we will study in detail later on. This may indicate, for instance, that a majority presence of PA in the government bodies excessively politicizes the firm's performance, hindering decision-making and, finally, having a negative effect on efficiency, as pointed out by Hansmann (1996) .
In the rest of the present article we will evaluate the management of savings banks executives when controlled by technological characteristics. In terms of the application presented here, this implies that the indexes of performance are obtained from specific frontiers for each group of savings banks.
Aggregate indexes of performance
In order to evaluate the management of the savings banks, the index of performance that incorporates the preferences revealed by the legislator (henceforth, RIP) provides us with a measurement of the overall efficiency reached by the savings bank. This index, the value of which is Due to the construction of the model, all savings banks fulfill now the restrictions imposed externally. Thus, we evaluate the management in an agency framework that specifies the goals to be reached and the relation of preference among them. The results in Table 6 indicate that RIP is, in average, higher in the subsample of savings banks controlled by insiders, which indicates that this type of entity is more efficient in relation to its own frontier. This frontier is constituted by the entities that, "exhausting" the possibilities of transformation that their own technology offers, respect the order of priorities defined ex-ante by the legislator. A total of 18 savings banks form the frontier, which represents almost a 35 per cent of the subsample, and the distance between the rest of savings banks and this frontier, which evaluates total inefficiency, can be quantified in 11.66 per cent. On the other hand, the index of performance of those savings banks controlled by PA is lower, 84.55 per cent, which indicates that the average inefficiency of the subsample amounts to 15.45 per cent.
[ Table 6 ]
In order to explain better the overall efficiency reached in a savings bank, our index of performance with revealed preferences has been decomposed into two elements: an index of performance without restrictions and the corresponding part to allocative efficiency. With this division, we try to evaluate the management in two dimensions: their skill to transform inputs into goals for the stakeholders and their ability to interpret the legislator's preferences. Table 6 also presents the results of the analysis of the contribution of savings banks to maximize the mission when the legislator's preferences are not taken into account, the already mentioned index of performance ( )
, which we will denote IP. As shown by the results, when we maximize the mission without imposing restrictions on weights, that is to say, when we apply programs [3] or [4] independently to each subsample of savings banks, we observe that savings banks controlled by insiders are more efficient in relation to their own frontier: 25 entities lie on the frontier, which constitutes a 48 per cent of the whole group, reaching an IP of 90.60 per cent.
The latter value indicates that, with the current consumption of inputs, the outputs are placed in, practically, 91 per cent of the transformation possibilities that technology offers. Therefore, to reach the frontier, savings banks controlled by insiders should increase all their outputs an average of a 9 %, a Table that represents the average inefficiency.
In savings banks controlled by PA, 38 per cent are on the frontier and the aggregate index of performance lowers to an 86.63 per cent. From the previous results, we can state that the management of savings banks controlled by insiders is closer to the frontier of good practice defined for their own group. Or, in other words, this type of entity is more efficient, when we define efficiency as the skill to manage the productive resources in order to reach the goals that have been given priority after a negotiation process among the groups that take part in the entity.
The previous analysis also allows us to evaluate the way in which managers satisfy the legislator's preferences. With this purpose, we have calculated the allocative efficiency (AE), which is the relation between overall efficiency (the above-mentioned RIP) and the index of performance without restrictions (IP), as described in expression [8] . AE provides a measurement of congruity between the legislator's preferences and the prioritization of goals that ensues from the negotiation process among the different stakeholders. From the results shown in Table 6 , we can estimate how allocative efficiency (AE) reaches values around 100 per cent in both groups. Especially, when insiders have control, AE is 98.6 in contrast to a 97.6 per cent when savings banks are controlled by PA. It is interesting to highlight that, despite the decrease in the number of savings banks placed on the frontier of each group when we incorporate the legislator's preferences, the number of allocative-efficient savings banks increases considerably (52% for insiders and 46% for PA).
Our interpretation is that the managers identify adequately the legislator's preferences revealed through the regulation on the composition of the government bodies. In the same line, if we assume that the management decisions are the result of the negotiation among different groups, and that the final decisions are made according to the previously fixed government rules and depending on the power of each of them, our result can indicate that there is no asymmetry between the formal control assigned by means of voting distribution and the real control exercised by each group, so that in practice the preferences that ensue from the private negotiation process between stakeholders are equivalent to the preferences ex-ante defined by the legislator.
Consequently, we may explain the differences of performance between both models of savings banks by the capacity of their managers to use efficiently productive resources and to obtain the goals which the groups whom they represent are interested in. In other words, the difference observed in the RIP index for both groups of savings banks does not obey so much to a problem of interpretation of the legislator's preferences (allocative efficiency), as to a problem in the implementation of the goals (index without restrictions, IP). Besides, as we have controlled by means of technology, we can attribute inefficiency of a particular savings bank to the management carried out by the entity's executives.
Priority structure according to the control model
After verifying that assigned inefficiency is very low, our aim centers now on the identification of the structure of the mission. That is to say, we want to determine the relative importance that each savings bank assigns to the goals of its mission as a result of the private negotiation among stakeholders. Thus, we will compare the results of this analysis to the relation of preference among goals defined ex-ante by the legislator.
The weights attached to each goal are obtained from the application of the dual program [4] to each of the two previous subsamples. According to the results shown in Table 7 , the two goals that receive more weight in those savings banks controlled by insiders are economic efficiency ( 2 µ ) and the universal financial service ( 1 µ ); the goals of encouragement of competition ( 3 µ ) and regional development ( 5 µ ) turn out to be the worst considered. These results corroborate our initial intuition that the majority assignment of control rights to insiders has consequences on the choice of the goals that will be implemented, which is confirmed in the bet on the growth of the entity, at the same time that they direct their activity to the attainment of maximum results.
[ Table 7 ]
As far as savings banks controlled by PA are concerned, the goals of regional development ( 
Conclusions
In recent works, among which Tirole (2001) should be outlined, a firm is considered a complex organization, where the search for particular interests does not necessarily lead to the maximization of social efficiency due to the presence of external factors that prevent it (e.g., hold-up and quasi-rents linked to the presence of specific investments). This is the reason why we have proposed to characterize a firm as an economy with presence of external effects, (Holmström, 1999) . According to this approach, managers should replace the goal of maximizing shareholder value with that of the maximization of an aggregation of stakeholders' value. By extension, the concern about the good government of the firm would center then on the design of institutions that force managers to recognize this new mission. In this context, the construction of an aggregate index of performance represents a way to calibrate the consequences of the possible agency conflict between the agent, the firm's managing team, and the multiple principals, that is, the stakeholders. At the same time, this index allows us to evaluate the contribution of each possible government alternative to solve the agency problem.
The aim of this work has been to study the particular management system of Spanish SB, identifying the degree in which different ownership structures contribute to the attainment of the goals marked by the mission of these financial institutions.
Reviewing the historical procedure and in-force laws has allowed us to identify the two dimensions that define the management system of SB: a wide mission that puts together the interests of such stakeholders as the founder entity, the PA, the depositors and the regulatory authorities, and a control system close to the model of shared control, since in the government bodies also different groups take part (founder entity, PA, contributors and personnel). Both characteristics turn the traditional analysis of SB government into an inadequate one from the perspective of the agency problem between managers and shareholders praised by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and it points out the need for a efficiency measure that allows us to evaluate the contribution of managers to the maximization of a multiple-goal mission.
In this paper we propose the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA presents remarkable advantages, as it allows getting used to situations of multiplicity of inputs and outputs, it requires less information about the underlying technology, and it solves the problem of aggregation when the weights attached to each variable are not available. This technique also allows us to elaborate an index of performance in the attainment of the mission and to obtain the weights attached to each of its goals. These weights can be interpreted as the relative importance of goals, that is, the result of negotiation among stakeholders according to previously defined management rules and to a specific allocation of control rights. Nevertheless, occasionally the legislator interferes in the negotiation among agents, trying to impose his own preferences, for example, by means of the regulation of the composition of the government bodies, and a question arises as to whether regulation has managed to implement the legislator's preferences in the organization. In the answer to this question, DEA allows us to externally impose restrictions on the weights included in the legislator's preferences.
Thus, it is possible to evaluate the distance that separates current decisions from those decisions that would place it on the frontier of good practices defined by the legislator.
Using the present European legislation, our empirical analysis differentiates two models of savings banks: those controlled by insiders and those controlled by PA. The differences in productive specialization and organizational characteristics of both types of banks have made it necessary for us to control for the productive technology as well.
In order to evaluate managers, the index of performance resulting from the incorporation of the legislator's preferences provides us with a measurement of the overall efficiency reached by the savings bank, which we have decomposed into technical efficiency (the index of performance without restrictions) and allocative efficiency.
When differentiating savings banks by their control (insider or public), we have confirmed that the differences in performance with revealed preferences are not explained by managers' mistakes when interpreting the legislator's preferences, since allocative inefficiency is, practically, insignificant. We do confirm, however, the existence of substantial differences in technical efficiency, understood as the managers' skill to transform inputs into goals for the stakeholders. And it is precisely these differences that If we center our attention on the debate about the government of savings banks and, especially, on the inverse relation between over-representation of some groups in the government bodies and economic efficiency reached by SB, we can argue that, in the light of the results obtained, the differences in ownership structure give rise to differences in SB technology and priority order, including the goal of economic efficiency. This is the reason why savings banks should not be evaluated exclusively in terms of economic efficiency, since they pursue multiple and different goals, which presumably law arises is whether it will improve SB efficiency. In view of our results, we can argue that the decrease in the weight of the PA group itself would suppose a change in the structure of priorities of the entity (i.e., it would increase the weight of goal "economic efficiency" to the detriment of other goals, as "regional development") and a light increase in the overall index of performance (our RIP). Nevertheless, global inefficiency would still be considerable (around 10 per cent). In this respect, one must only wait for the ending of the events to see if these changes suppose an improvement of technical efficiency, which probably constitutes the main problem of Spanish savings banks. 
